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PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT BELIEF 
Zach Barnett  
Abstract: Should we believe our controversial philosophical views? Recently, 
several authors have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we 
should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: If we believe 
our views, we are irrational. If we do not, we are not sincere in holding them. 
This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take to-
ward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should 
arrive at our views via a certain sort of ‘insulated’ reasoning – that is, reason-
ing that involves setting aside certain higher-order worries, such as those 
provided by disagreement – when we investigate philosophical questions. 
Here is what seems to be a fact about our discipline: Some of us really believe 
the controversial philosophical views we advocate.1 Some of us really believe 
that it can sometimes be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, that seemingly 
vague predicates must have precise application conditions, or that a person 
would survive if each of her brain cells were replaced with an artificial func-
tional duplicate. 
Here is another fact about our discipline: There is widespread disagree-
ment among philosophers surrounding these issues.2 Given certain assump-
tions about the nature of these philosophical disagreements, and given cer-
tain assumptions about the epistemic import of disagreement more generally, 
one might come to doubt that our controversial philosophical beliefs are ra-
tional – insofar as we have them. Indeed, numerous authors have developed 
arguments along these lines.3 The details of their arguments need not concern 
us, but it will be useful to examine briefly one argument in outline, which 
will serve as a representative simplification of what they have said: 
Conciliationism: A person is rationally required to withhold belief in the face of 
disagreement – given that certain conditions are met.4 
Applicability: Many disagreements in philosophy meet these conditions. 
No Rational Belief: Philosophers aren’t rational to believe many of their contro-
versial views. 
                                                
1 DeRose (forthcoming) argues that we do not genuinely believe our controversial views 
in philosophy, offering an intriguing story about what we might be doing instead. While I 
suspect that at least some of us do genuinely believe our controversial views, the arguments 
given here do not depend on any such assumption. 
2 The Bourget and Chalmers (2013) survey asks philosophers for their views on thirty 
questions that are taken to be central to the field. For virtually all of these, we do not observe 
anything like consensus. 
3 See Brennan (2010), Christensen (2014), Fumerton (2010), Goldberg (2009, 2013a), Korn-
blith (2010, 2013), Licon (2012). 
4 Although there is some debate over how these conditions should be characterized, it suf-
fices for us to note that they typically involve the person’s having good reason to consider her 
disagreer(s) equally trustworthy, with respect to the disputed sort of issue, as she considers 
herself (and her agreers). 
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The first premise, Conciliationism, enjoys ample precedent.5 Its strengths and 
weaknesses have been thoroughly explored. I will not rehearse the debate 
here. The second premise, Applicability, is somewhat less familiar, however, 
so it may be helpful to see what has been said about it. Here is how Christen-
sen motivates the position: 
I do have good reason to have as much epistemic respect for my philosophical 
opponents as I have for my philosophical allies and for myself… In some cases, I 
have specific information about particular people, either on the basis of general 
knowledge or from reading or talking to the particular epistemologists in ques-
tion. [...]  
But another reason derives from the group nature of philosophical contro-
versy. It seems clear that the groups of people who disagree with me on various 
philosophical issues are quite differently composed. Many who are on my side of 
one issue will be on the other side of different issues. With this structural feature 
of group disagreement in philosophy in mind, it seems clear that it could hardly 
be rational for me to think that I’m part of some special subgroup of unusually 
smart, diligent, or honest members of the profession. (Christensen 2014, p. 146) 
Kornblith takes a similar view, at least with respect to one specific debate: 
Disagreements within philosophy constitute a particularly interesting case... 
Consider the debate between internalists and externalists about epistemic justifi-
cation.  I am a committed externalist.  I have argued for this position at length 
and on numerous occasions. [...]  
At the same time, I recognize, of course, that there are many philosophers 
who are equally committed internalists about justification[.] It would be reassur-
ing to believe that I have better evidence on this question than those who disa-
gree with me, that I have thought about this issue longer than internalists, or that 
I am simply smarter than they are, my judgment superior to theirs.  It would be 
reassuring to believe these things, but I don’t believe them; they are all manifest-
ly untrue. (Kornblith 2010, p. 31) 
In light of these observations, Applicability, too, can seem to be a fairly at-
tractive position.6 
This paper takes both Conciliationism and Applicability for granted 
(along with their consequence, No Rational Belief) in order to investigate 
what sense we can make of philosophy if they are true. If we philosophers –
in an effort to be more rational – suddenly decided to withhold belief about 
all philosophically controversial matters, would the practice of philosophy be 
                                                
5 See Feldman and Warfield (2009), or Christensen and Lackey (2013) for helpful discus-
sions of this principle.  
6 An opponent of Applicability is Grundmann (2013). Grundmann points out that even if 
my opponent is, in general, as philosophically competent as I am (equally honest, equally in-
telligent, equally hardworking, etc.), she may not be as reliable as I am with respect to the dis-
puted issue. The observation is a good one. But it is worth noting that these general competen-
cies can still serve as fallible indicators of one’s domain-specific reliability. Grundmann does 
not argue that there is no correlation between these distinct competencies. 
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in any way diminished? As we will see, there is some cause for concern.7 
1  The Sincere Philosopher’s Dilemma 
On the face of it, it is not immediately clear why giving up our philosophical 
beliefs should lead to any problems. Take competitive debate. It is surely 
quite common for a debater to defend a view she does not, strictly speaking, 
believe. And this fact hardly serves to undermine the practice of debate. Why 
should it be any different in philosophy? Perhaps we arrive at certain views, 
somehow or other, and then defend them as ably as we can manage – with-
out necessarily believing them to be true. Might this be a reasonable way for 
philosophy to operate? 
 I find myself somewhat uncomfortable with this picture. In particular, it 
seems to me that if philosophy were to operate this way, something im-
portant would be missing: namely, the sincerity with which we defend our 
preferred positions – a distinctive kind of sincerity that is often lacking in the 
context of competitive debate. 
 The kind of sincerity that I have in mind is a way in which I suspect many 
philosophers identify with the views they defend. The thought is that, for 
many of us, our views seem right to us, in some important sense. When I re-
flect on the relevant issues, my thinking leads me to certain conclusions. And 
if I were, for some reason, obligated to defend other views (perhaps because 
they were assigned to me by some governing body), these other views would 
not be as sincerely held. In defending the assigned views, I would not neces-
sarily be calling the shots as I see them; my own thinking would not have led 
to them. 
This is supposed to capture, intuitively, what it takes for one’s views to be 
sincerely held.8 My claim is not that philosophers ought to hold their views sin-
cerely, but rather, that many philosophers do experience this sincere com-
mitment toward their favored views and would prefer to be able to continue 
doing philosophy in this sincere manner. And this may be more than just a 
personal preference for the feeling of sincerity. It is plausible that for many of 
us, doing philosophy well – energetically and creatively – comes most natu-
rally when we do sincerely identify with the views we defend. 
If this is right, then we ‘sincere’ philosophers have a potentially serious 
problem on our hands. There seems to be a tension between this sincerity de-
sideratum, on the one hand, and No Rational Belief, on the other. We can put 
the point as a dilemma: 
Sincere Philosopher’s Dilemma: Either we philosophers will believe our 
                                                
7 The following discussion is indebted to Goldberg (2013b). Goldberg’s view will be dis-
cussed in detail later. 
8 My choice of the word ‘sincere’ should not be taken to indicate that philosophers who 
lack this feeling toward their views are being insincere, in some problematic way. I am simply 
pointing out a way in which many of us identify with the views we defend. 
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controversial views or we will not. If we do, then we will be irrational. If 
we do not, then our views will not be sincerely held. 
The main task of this paper is to show how this challenge can be met. But 
first, the challenge should be strengthened. The worry that gives rise to the 
challenge is that belief is required for the relevant kind of sincerity. But this 
claim is probably too strong. 
To see this, assume a Lockean account of belief, according to which out-
right belief just is confidence above a certain threshold, say .75. Let us imag-
ine that I often spend my time working out difficult math problems, replete 
with tempting pitfalls that frequently trip me up. Over the years, my success 
rate on these problems is only .74, and I know this fact about my reliability. 
As a result, when I arrive at an answer to any one of these problems, my con-
fidence in the answer I reach tends not to be quite high enough for belief. De-
spite my lack of outright belief in my answer, the answer I arrive at still 
seems right to me, in an important sense. My own thinking led me to it. And 
even though I recognize that there is a good chance I erred, overall, I regard 
my answer as more likely to be correct than not. In such a case, I find it natu-
ral to say that my commitment to the answer I arrived at is sincere in the rel-
evant sense. If this is right, then outright belief in one’s view is not necessary 
for sincerity. 
Perhaps this is right. Even if so, it seems to me that the dilemma propo-
nent need not be terribly concerned, for she can reply as follows: 
Perhaps I was too quick in suggesting that outright belief was the only doxastic 
attitude capable of supporting sincerely held views. A fairly high credence prob-
ably can do the trick. But this observation hardly saves the sincere philosopher, 
for it is doubtful that we can rationally maintain high credences in our controver-
sial views. The same considerations that gave rise to No Rational Belief (i.e. Con-
ciliationism, Applicability) are sure to entail a parallel No Rational High Confi-
dence principle, which will forbid the high credences present in the alleged 
counterexample. So here’s a more general challenge: Tell us specifically which at-
titude you will take toward controversial views that can get you both rationality 
and sincerity. 
This reply seems to me to be exactly right. The challenge is not simply to 
demonstrate how to achieve sincerity without belief, but rather, to demon-
strate that there is some attitude, or some set of attitudes, which allow for 
sincere and sensible participation in philosophy. The next section examines 
one potential answer, due to Sanford Goldberg. 
2  Philosophical Views as Speculations 
Goldberg has explored nearby territory in a series of recent papers (2013a, 
2013b). He defends a version of No Rational Belief, and so he is concerned 
with a question similar to the one we are considering. He writes: 
Unless we want to condemn philosophers to widespread unreasonableness (!), 
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we must allow that their doxastic attitude towards contested propositions is, or 
at any rate can be, something other than that of belief. (Goldberg 2013b, p. 282) 
Though Goldberg is not explicitly concerned with allowing that philosophers 
can sincerely hold their views in the sense discussed in the previous section, 
he is sensitive to nearby issues, such as the sincerity of philosophical asser-
tion. 
Goldberg thinks that there is indeed an attitude that we philosophers can 
and should rationally take toward our views: ‘[T]here is an attitudinal cousin 
of belief which is reasonable to have even under conditions of systematic dis-
agreement and which captures much, if perhaps not all, of the things that are 
involved in “having a view” in philosophy’ (Goldberg 2013b, p. 284). The rel-
evant state is called ‘attitudinal speculation’: 
Speculation: [O]ne who attitudinally speculates that p regards p as more likely 
than not-p, though also regards the total evidence as stopping short of warranting 
belief in p. (Goldberg 2013b, p. 283) 
Goldberg goes on to suggest that this attitude is what is required for sincere 
and proper assertion in the context of philosophy. The picture of philosophy 
being recommended (henceforth, ‘the speculation picture’) is, I think, a fairly 
natural one: Advocates of Incompatibilism, say, should hold their view to be 
more likely than its rival; at the same time, they should acknowledge that the 
total evidence (including evidence from disagreement) does not permit suffi-
cient confidence in Incompatibilism for outright belief.  
This picture is most attractive when applied to philosophical issues that 
divide philosophers into exactly two camps. Goldberg’s picture may require 
refinement, however, in order to handle debates consisting of three or more 
rival positions. For example, take normative ethics. Oversimplifying dramati-
cally, let us suppose that Consequentialism, Deontology, and Virtue Ethics 
are equally popular, mutually exclusive views exhausting the plausible op-
tions. According to the speculation picture, my being a Deontologist will re-
quire me to have a credence in Deontology exceeding .5. There are two poten-
tial worries here.  
First, it is not clear that such a high level of confidence in Deontology can 
be rationally maintained, on a broadly Conciliationist picture. Admittedly, 
the version of Conciliationism discussed in the introduction, which dealt 
with all-or-nothing beliefs, would be silent about this question. But some ver-
sions of Conciliationism do place rational constraints on one’s level of confi-
dence, and in general, they would demand that one’s level of confidence in 
Deontology be roughly ⅓ in a case like this.9 
                                                
9 In the case described, the three views were supposed to be about equally popular. So 
about ⅔ of my peers reject Deontology and opt for one of the other two views. If I have every 
reason to think these opponents are, in general, as philosophically reliable as my fellow Deon-
tologists (and myself), then I will not be rationally permitted (from within a broadly Concilia-
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Second, one of the most attractive features of the speculation picture — its 
ability to allow us to favor our own view very slightly — seems to disappear 
in cases like this one. Suppose that my confidence in Deontology is .4, while 
my confidence in each alternative is .3. It would seem to make sense to classi-
fy me as a Deontologist, but, according to Goldberg’s view, this would be a 
mistake. My confidence in Deontology is, apparently, too low. So the attrac-
tive feature of the speculation picture disappears in cases like this. 
With the foregoing problems in mind, we might modify Goldberg’s view 
as follows: 
Speculation*: One who attitudinally speculates that p regards p as the likeliest 
option (given some set of options), though also regards the total evidence as 
stopping short of warranting belief in p. 
This amended version seems to capture the spirit of Goldberg’s proposal 
nicely, allowing us to lean slightly toward our preferred positions even when 
there are multiple incompatible ones on offer.10 Can the revised account pro-
vide an answer to our dilemma? Specifically, can speculation* be the doxastic 
attitude underlying our philosophical commitments? 
3  Obstacles for the Speculation Account 
In assessing his own account, Goldberg points out that attitude of speculation 
may not be sufficient for having a view in philosophy, since proponents of a 
philosophical view are ‘typically more motivated to persist in defense of the 
view when challenged, than is one who merely speculates that p’ (Goldberg 
2013b, p. 284). In response, he suggests that speculation should be taken to be 
a necessary condition on having a philosophical view, not a sufficient one 
(Goldberg 2013b, p. 284). 
But there is reason to worry that speculation (and even speculation*), 
may not be a necessary condition, either. There seem to be cases in which one 
can sensibly have a view, despite regarding it as less likely, all things consid-
ered, than some rival view. Anticipating this complaint, Goldberg asks 
whether it ever makes sense for one to defend a view she regards as a ‘long 
shot.’ Ultimately, he suggests, though, that there is something ‘slightly per-
verse’ about one’s holding a view even when she does not think that the view 
                                                                                                                          
tionist framework) to think my side is more likely right than not on this occasion. See, e.g., 
Elga (2007). 
10 It is also worth noting that speculation* incurs a problem of individuation from which 
the original speculation is immune. Suppose that my confidence in Consequentialism is .4 and 
that my confidence in each of the others is .3. Since I regard Consequentialism as likelier than 
the other options, it seems clear that I do take the attitude of speculation* toward Consequen-
tialism. But we might carve the options up differently: If instead we say that there are two 
views on the table – Consequentialism and non-Consequentialism – then I cannot be said to 
take the attitude of speculation* toward Consequentialism after all. We can set this difficulty 
aside, however, for I will suggest that both versions of the speculation picture are susceptible 
to a more pressing problem. 
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will, in the end, be better-supported by the total evidence (Goldberg 2013b, p. 
283 fn. 5). While I share the intuition, thinking about certain cases suggests to 
me that this is not as problematic as it might seem. Consider an analogy: 
Logic Team: You are on a five-player logic team. The team is to be given a logic 
problem with possible answers p and not-p. There is one minute allotted for each 
player to work out the problem alone followed by a ten-second voting phase, 
during which the team members vote one by one. The answer favored by a majori-
ty of your team is submitted.  
You arrive at p. During the voting phase, Vi, who is generally more reliable 
than you are on problems like these, votes first, for not-p. You are next. Which 
way should you vote? 
Given a broadly Conciliationist view, it is not rational for you to regard your 
answer of p as more likely than its negation, after seeing Vi vote. But there is, 
I think, still pressure on you to vote for the answer you arrived at, rather than 
the one you now regard as most likely to be correct. 
We can illustrate this by adding a bit more information to the case. Sup-
pose that Vi’s reliability is .9, that the reliability of each other team member is 
.75, that each team member is statistically independent of each other, and that 
the team is aware of this information. If everyone were to defer to Vi during 
voting, the team would perform sub-optimally in the long run.11 So in this 
collaborative truth-seeking context, there is nothing troublesome about ‘de-
fending’ a view while thinking that it is more likely incorrect than not. More 
generally, we can see that, in this context at least, one’s all-things-considered 
confidence is no sure guide to what view one should put forward as one’s 
own.  
Does this point carry over to philosophy? Perhaps. Within a broadly Con-
ciliationist framework, how popular a position is (among some group of 
trustworthy evaluators) partly determines how much confidence one should 
have in that position, all things considered. But it seems doubtful that the 
philosophical popularity of a view should have much impact on whether a 
given philosopher should hold that view herself. Consider an example. 
Turning Tide: Physicalism seems right to Pat. She finds the arguments for Physi-
calism to be persuasive; she is unmoved by the objections. And at present, Physi-
calism is the most popular view among philosophers of mind/metaphysics. On 
balance, she considers herself a Physicalist. 
Later, the philosophical tide turns in favor of Dualism. Perhaps new argu-
ments are devised; perhaps the familiar objections to Physicalism simply gain 
traction. In any case, Pat remains unimpressed. She does not find the new argu-
ments for Dualism to be particularly strong, and the old objections continue to 
seem as defective to her as they always have.  
                                                
11 Following this strategy, the team’s reliability would just be Vi’s reliability: .90. If each 
team member votes without deferring, the team’s reliability can be shown to be considerably 
higher: approximately 0.93. 
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What should Pat’s view be, in a case like this? If Pat is a Conciliationist who 
happens to regard other philosophers of mind and metaphysics as generally 
trustworthy about philosophical matters (which we’ll suppose she is), her all-
things-considered confidence in Physicalism may well decrease as Dualism 
becomes the dominant view, perhaps dipping below .5. But what seems 
strange is that once Pat’s all-things-considered confidence in Physicalism falls 
low enough, and once her all-things-considered confidence in Dualism rises 
high enough, she should stop being a Physicalist (and perhaps become a Du-
alist) — solely on the basis of its popularity, and despite that, when she thinks 
about the relevant arguments and objections, Physicalism still seems more plausible 
to her. Perhaps there is a special role for one’s own consideration of the issues 
to play in contexts like these. 
4 Disagreement-insulated Inclination 
Thinking about the preceding examples suggests a different approach alto-
gether: As a philosopher, my views should be informed only by the way that 
some of the evidence seems to me to point. In particular, I should set aside the 
evidence I get from the agreement and disagreement of other philosophers in 
thinking the issues through. The views that strike me as correct, with this 
disagreement evidence set aside, are the views I should hold. Of course, the 
evidence I get from agreement and disagreement remains epistemically rele-
vant to my all-things-considered beliefs. But for the purposes of the larger 
project of which I am a part, in order to arrive at my views, I reason as if it is 
not.12 
A good way to get a handle on the proposal is to think about how one 
typically reacts to a perceptual illusion, such as the one below.  
 
Viewers almost always incorrectly judge the lettered regions to be different in 
shade. Importantly, the apparent discrepancy between these identically 
shaded regions tends to remain even after the viewer has become convinced 
                                                
12 While this paper is about philosophy, the idea may have broader application to other 
collaborative, truth-seeking disciplines, such as in the Logic Team example. 
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of their constancy. The viewer continues to have the seeming or inclination, 
but does not endorse it.13 
An analogous phenomenon occurs when one gains evidence that one’s 
own reasoning about a given topic is likely to be defective in some way. Con-
sider a case involving judgment-distorting drugs:14 
Deducing While Intoxicated: Basil works through a non-trivial logic problem 
and comes to believe p. She then learns that, before she attempted to solve the 
problem, she ingested a drug that impinges on one’s deductive reasoning skills. 
It causes ordinarily reliable thinkers to miss certain logic problems (such as the 
one she just tried) at least half of the time. She rereads the problem and finds her-
self inclined to reason as before: The information given still seems to her to imply 
p. But she refrains from endorsing this seeming and suspends belief. 
In the story, Basil is, in some sense, inclined to accept a certain claim as true, 
but opts not to endorse the inclination because of evidence that the mecha-
nisms that produced it may be epistemically defective in some way. This evi-
dence about one’s own cognitive capacities is widely known as ‘higher-order 
evidence’ (evidence about one’s ability to evaluate evidence). Notice that the 
‘seemings’ or ‘inclinations’ that persist despite what is learned are, in some 
way, not sensitive to this higher-order evidence. In some sense, one can re-
tain the ability to see things as if the higher-order evidence were not there, or 
were not relevant.  
But how is this observation relevant to philosophy? Evidence from disa-
greement (and agreement) is thought to provide higher-order evidence, too.15 
So the suggestion, to put it roughly, is this: Philosophers should favor the 
views that seem right to them, ignoring certain bits of higher-order evidence 
(including evidence from disagreement/agreement). David Chalmers helpful-
ly characterizes a related idea:16 
[A] level-crossing principle... is a principle by which one’s higher-order beliefs 
about one’s cognitive capacity are used to restrain one’s first-order beliefs about 
a subject matter. [...] We can imagine a cognizer—call him Achilles—who is at 
least sometimes insensitive to this sort of level-crossing principle. On occasion, 
                                                
13 The seeming prompted by this illusion may involve alief, a representational mental state 
that can conflict with one’s explicit beliefs. See Gendler (2008). For the purposes of this paper, 
the operative attitude will be conditional belief, not alief. 
14 See Christensen (2007, 2010, 2011, forthcoming) for thorough discussion of similar ex-
amples. 
15 See Kelly (2005) and Christensen (2007) for influential early discussions that take this 
viewpoint. 
16 Others have made reference to an idea like this as well. Schoenfield (2014, pp. 2-3) de-
fines your ‘judgment’ as ‘the proposition you regard, or would regard as most likely to be cor-
rect on the basis of the first-order evidence alone.’ Horowitz and Sliwa (2015) make use of an 
idea in this vicinity in their discussion of one’s ‘first order attitude’. While these attitudes are 
close to the one I will rely on, the first-order/higher-order distinction turns out not to be quite 
right for the purposes of this paper. 
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Achilles goes into the mode of insulated cognition. When in this mode, Achilles 
goes where first-order theoretical reasoning takes him, entirely insulated from 
higher-order beliefs about his cognitive capacity. He might acquire evidence that 
he is unreliable about mathematics, and thereby come to believe ‘I am unreliable 
about arithmetic’, but he will go on drawing conclusions about arithmetic all the 
same. (Chalmers 2012, pp. 103-104) 
This idea of ‘insulated reasoning’ will be useful. The thought is that in phi-
losophy (and in other collaborative truth-seeking contexts), we should try to 
reason in a way that is insulated from certain evidence, including the evi-
dence we get from disagreement, in determining our views. For reasons we 
will discuss, it will turn out that we do not want to be insulated from all 
higher-order evidence, as Achilles is in Chalmers’ example. But before we 
can discuss which evidence we will want to wall ourselves off from, we will 
need to say a bit about what ‘walling off’ or ‘insulation’ amounts to. As it 
stands, it is unclear from Chalmers’ discussion whether insulated reasoning 
is supposed to be something that we humans ever do or are even capable of.  
The relevant sort of reasoning is of a quite familiar variety: conditional 
reasoning. We reason conditionally when we reason as if, or supposing, or on 
the condition that our evidence were different than it actually is.17 Conditional 
reasoning can be divided into additive and subtractive varieties. In additive 
cases, we introduce a supposition over and above whatever evidence we al-
ready have, and then reason accordingly (e.g. ‘Supposing we get to the DMV 
by ten, I think it’s likely that we’ll be out of there by noon.’). Subtractive cases 
are less common. In such cases, we focus only on a subset of our evidence, 
ignoring or bracketing some of the evidence we already have, reasoning as if 
it were not there.18 Trial jurors are sometimes expected to engage in this kind 
of reasoning when a piece of evidence is deemed inadmissible. 19 Suppose, for 
example, that unambiguous video footage of a defendant’s crime was collect-
ed without a search warrant. A juror who becomes aware of the video might 
well be instructed to assess the likelihood that the defendant is guilty – set-
ting the video evidence aside altogether. Of course, the verdict she reaches 
may differ markedly from her all-things-considered opinion about the guilt 
of the defendant.  
                                                
17 There is some impulse to understand claims of the form ‘Conditional on evidence E, I 
think p’ counterfactually: ‘Were I to acquire evidence E, I would think p’ This impulse should 
be resisted. An example from Horowitz (2015) can be used to illustrate this. Imagine that Ivan 
becomes severely irrational whenever he believes that spiders are nearby. But let us add, real-
istically, that Ivan can suppose that there are spiders nearby without any significant problems. 
What Ivan does think, on the supposition that there are spiders nearby, may turn out to be 
quite different from what he would think, were he to learn that spiders are nearby. 
18 It is worth noting that subtractive conditional reasoning is, formally, more problematic 
than the additive conditional reasoning. We understand conditionalization; can we make sense 
of ‘de-conditionalization’? See Joyce (1999) and Christensen (1999). 
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this example. 
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In both additive and subtractive cases, a person evaluates which way 
some body of evidence (which may or may not be the evidence she in fact 
possesses) seems to her to point. For ease of expression, if a certain body of 
evidence E seems to me to support p, we will say that I am inclined, on E, to-
ward p.  
We can now put the driving thought this way: When one is doing philos-
ophy with the aim of determining her philosophical views, she should not be 
evaluating all of the evidence she has. Instead, she should be focusing on a 
special subset of this evidence. Her views should be determined by her incli-
nations on this evidence (i.e. by the way this evidence seems to her to point). 
What is the special subset of evidence? Provisionally, we will say that the rel-
evant subset is: All of the evidence minus that from disagreement and 
agreement of fellow philosophers. So, on this picture, a person’s philosophi-
cal views should be her disagreement-insulated inclinations (i.e. the positions 
that seem to her supported by the evidence not from agreement and disa-
greement of her peers). To see how this should work, we can apply it to the 
Turning Tide example that caused some trouble for the speculation picture.  
At the end of the Turning Tide example, the available arguments and ev-
idence seemed to Pat to support Physicalism, but the field was dominated by 
Dualists. On the current proposal, in arriving at her philosophical views, Pat 
is supposed to think about all of the evidence except for the evidence from 
disagreement and agreement. This body of evidence includes the arguments 
and objections with which she is familiar, and which, on balance, seem to her 
to support Physicalism. In other words, Pat’s disagreement-insulated inclina-
tion is toward Physicalism. This makes her a Physicalist. 
This is not to say that she should believe Physicalism to be true, or even 
that she should be more confident of Physicalism than she is of its negation. 
If she had to bet on one of the two positions, it would be wiser for her to bet 
on Dualism, given its popularity among philosophers whom she has good 
reason to respect. So her all-things-considered confidence in Physicalism may 
be rather low, since it is sensitive to all her evidence, which includes the evi-
dence from disagreement. But the key point is that, as a member of the philo-
sophical community, one’s holding of a view and one’s all-things-considered 
level of confidence in the truth of that view can come dramatically apart. 
5  Answering the Dilemma 
We began this paper seeking an attitude that would enable us to practice phi-
losophy in a sincere, rational way. Disagreement-insulated inclination is an 
appealing candidate for the elusive attitude we sought. This section explores 
how well the attitude fares with respect to the sincerity and rationality desid-
erata, and discusses the role that these inclinations should play more broadly. 
Sincerity: Can disagreement-insulated inclination support sincerely held 
philosophical views? The Physicalism example discussed at the end of the 
previous section provides some reason to think so. For Pat does seem to be a 
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sincere Physicalist – both before and after Dualism becomes the dominant 
view. It should be recognized, however, that there is one way in which Pat’s 
commitment is less than fully sincere: She regards Dualism as more likely to 
be true, all things considered. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Pat’s commit-
ment to Physicalism remains sincerely held, in an important sense. When we 
characterized the sincerity desideratum initially, we wanted it to be the case 
that the views we hold would trace back to our own consideration of the is-
sues. We wanted our views to seem right to us, in some important sense. And 
Pat’s commitment to Physicalism meets these conditions with flying colors. 
So, at least in this case, disagreement-insulated inclination seems well suited 
to support the desired sort of sincerity.  
Of course, there is a real question about why disagreement-insulated in-
clination is able to support sincerity. After all, disagreement-insulated incli-
nation is a special case of subtractive conditional reasoning (i.e. reasoning 
that involves bracketing some of one’s evidence). And subtractive conditional 
reasoning does not generally foster sincerity of the relevant sort: Think of the 
juror who judges the defendant to be innocent only because she bracketed 
overwhelming video evidence ruled inadmissible during her deliberation. 
This juror is inclined, on the admissible evidence, toward the conclusion that 
the defendant is innocent. But, presumably, this juror’s inclination would not 
be sincere, in the relevant sense. Why should we expect that, as a rule, our 
philosophical inclinations will be more sincere than the juror’s inclination in 
this example?20 
In thinking about this, it is important to note that the view on the table is 
decidedly not that any old use of subtractive conditional reasoning will de-
liver sincere inclinations. Given a body of evidence, one can take any chunk 
of it and set it aside in one’s reasoning. When one does this, the inclinations 
one has will certainly not always ‘seem right’ in any important sense at all. It 
will matter crucially which evidence one sets aside. But, then, what makes 
disagreement evidence so special? Why does bracketing evidence from disa-
greement tend to result in seemings with which we sincerely identify? 
As it happens, this property is not unique to disagreement evidence: It is 
a feature of higher-order evidence more generally. Very often, bracketing 
higher-order evidence will tend to facilitate sincere inclinations of the rele-
vant kind. Recall the example of Basil and the judgment-distorting drug. 
There, Basil arrives at p by reasoning herself through the logic problem di-
rectly. In the end, she declines to trust the output of this reasoning, because of 
information about the likely effects of the drug she took. All things consid-
ered, Basil might well regard p and not-p as equally likely to be correct. But 
even if she regards both propositions as equally likely, she does not neces-
sarily harbor identical attitudes toward the two propositions. Importantly, 
                                                
20 Thanks to an anonymous referee for posing this question. 
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Basil still has access to her direct thinking about this question, which led her 
to p. As a result, if asked to defend p, Basil will have something sincere and 
substantial to say – even if it turns out to be incorrect. If asked to defend not-
p, she may not have much to say at all – and if she were to try, it might well 
feel to her as though she is trying to trick her audience. The key point is that a 
certain kind of sincerity remains connected to Basil’s first-order judgment, 
even when she admits that the first-order judgment is likely to be mistaken. 
Higher-order evidence leads one to doubt one’s own direct thinking about 
some core body of evidence. But there can often be a kind of seeming pro-
duced by that direct thinking – whether or not one trusts it. Even after one 
acquires evidence that the direct thinking is not reliable, the direct thinking 
does not tend to vanish; it will still be there, and it may even be correct. And 
when the direct thinking is still there, we will be in a position to advocate for 
the conclusion it produced in a way that bears important hallmarks of sincer-
ity: The position will seem right to us in a psychologically gripping way, and 
we will have something substantial to say in support of it, which we can see 
no flaw in. In short, because disagreement is a species of higher-order evi-
dence, it seems plausible that bracketing disagreement will tend to support 
the kind of sincerity that No Rational Belief seemed to place in jeopardy.21 
Rationality: Let us now turn to rationality. There are two important ques-
tions to address here. First, is the attitude of disagreement-insulated inclina-
tion rationally assessable? And, second, can we be rational in taking this atti-
tude toward our controversial philosophical views? There is good reason to 
think that the answer to both questions is ‘yes.’ Evidence from disagreement 
is, in general, what precludes us from rationally believing our controversial 
philosophical views. With the disagreement evidence set aside, being in-
clined toward a view can indeed be rational – so long as the view one is in-
clined toward is in fact the view that the remaining evidence supports. A 
modified version of the judgment-distorting drug case discussed earlier can 
be used to illustrate the operative rational norm.22  
Deducing While Intoxicated 2: Basil and Sage both attempt to solve a challeng-
ing logic problem with correct answer p. Before attempting the problem, each lo-
gician learned that she ingested a drug that impinges on one’s deductive reason-
ing skills. During past experimentation, Basil and Sage discovered that they tend 
to answer challenging logic problems correctly about half the time, after having 
ingested the drug.  
On this occasion, Basil correctly deduces p, while Sage loses track of a nega-
tion symbol, and arrives at ~p. After obtaining these results, both immediately 
temper their confidence in their respective answers considerably, because they 
                                                
21 Here, one might be tempted to ask: Why only bracket disagreement evidence in one’s 
philosophical reasoning? Why not just bracket all higher-order evidence? These questions lead 
to some interesting complexities, which will be addressed in §6. 
22 See Christensen (forthcoming) for discussion of closely related questions.  
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suspect that their logical reasoning faculties were off-kilter. Indeed, despite hav-
ing reached different answers, both logicians end up with the same level of con-
fidence in p: .5.  
Basil and Sage ended up at the same place. But intuitively, we want to say 
that Basil’s reasoning was totally rational and that Sage’s was not (since 
Sage’s reasoning was based importantly on a mistake).23 Thinking about this 
case in terms of inclination can help us to account for this intuition. Even 
though Basil and Sage have the same attitude toward p, all things considered, 
notice that setting aside evidence about the drug, Basil and Sage are inclined to-
ward different positions. (Basil might say: ‘If this drug’s a dud, then definite-
ly p.’ Sage might say: ‘If this drug’s a dud, then definitely ~p.’) And notice 
that because the non-drug evidence really does support p, only Basil’s incli-
nation is fully rational. So it does seem to make sense to say that insulated 
inclinations can be assessed for rationality. 
We should think of this situation as analogous to the situation that we 
philosophers are often in. With respect to our all-things-considered attitude, 
philosophical disagreement may compel us to be at the same place: agnosti-
cism. But setting the evidence from disagreement and agreement aside, we 
will still have our inclinations, and these will differ from person to person. 
Some of us are like Basil, rationally inclined toward the position the relevant 
evidence supports. Others of us are like Sage, mistakenly inclined toward 
some other position. So it will not turn out that all philosophers who take the 
attitude of disagreement-insulated inclination are fully rational in holding 
their views. But so long as one’s inclination is directed toward the position 
that is in fact supported by the relevant evidence (i.e. the evidence not from 
disagreement), one can be rational in holding that position as one’s view. 
While it may be irrational to believe one’s controversial philosophical views, it 
is not necessarily irrational to be inclined toward them, setting disagreement 
aside.  
The Role of Inclinations: At this point, we have seen that the prospect of 
holding controversial philosophical views in a sincere, rational way can sur-
vive the threat posed by disagreement – provided that we philosophers take 
the right kind of attitude toward our controversial views. But if we adhere to 
this guideline – if the attitude underlying our philosophical commitments is 
that of disagreement-insulated inclination – one might wonder about the sta-
tus of any actions based on those commitments. 
A person’s philosophical commitments are rarely wholly inert; they may 
lead a person to make assertions or to pursue courses of action. This raises 
difficult, important questions. If we are supposed to harbor two distinct atti-
tudes toward certain philosophical propositions – our all-things-considered 
                                                
23 Kelly (2010, pp. 122-124) discusses a case with a similar structure (though no drugs are 
involved). 
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credence and our dispute-insulated view – on which should we rely when we 
teach our classes, when we advocate for public policies, when we vote, or 
when we directly influence public policy in other ways?24 
Though it may not be possible to answer these questions in a uniform or 
categorical manner, it will be instructive to consider several different con-
texts, to illustrate how these questions can be answered, and the kinds of 
considerations that are relevant, in thinking through these issues. To start, 
consider a medical example: 
Doctors: Holly is one of fifty doctors who are all concerned with a specific ill-
ness. These doctors have two distinct responsibilities related to this illness: They 
treat patients who are suffering from the illness, and they also perform research 
into how the illness should be treated. 
There are two main drugs available for treatment and research: X and Y. 
Though there is a large body of data available concerning the efficacy of these 
drugs, the data are not fully conclusive. Forty-five of the doctors are inclined to 
think that X is more effective, but the other five – including Holly – are inclined 
to think that Y is more effective. For medical reasons, it is not possible to admin-
ister both X and Y to a single patient safely. And, in addition, it is not possible for 
a doctor to research more than one of these drugs at a time.  
Holly knows all of this and is trying to determine both how she should treat 
the patients she sees and where she should focus her research efforts. 
Given certain assumptions about the above case, it seems clear that all the 
doctors – Holly included – should administer X to their patients. To see this, 
suppose that Holly does not see herself as any more likely to make accurate 
assessments of drug efficacy than the other doctors. Indeed, in the past, when 
there has been an absence of consensus among the doctors about which of 
two drugs is most efficacious, the larger group has tended to be right nine 
times out of ten. Given this track record, and given that a great majority of 
the doctors judged X to be more effective on this occasion, it would seem ir-
responsible for Holly (or any other doctor possessing the same evidence) to 
do anything other than administer X to an ailing patient.  
At the same time, it may well make good sense for Holly to investigate 
the efficacy of Y in her research. As a member of the research community, 
Holly should do whatever will aid the group in its efforts to determine con-
clusively which drug is most effective. Toward this end, it may not be opti-
mal to have all fifty doctors devoting their research efforts to the same drug – 
even if that drug is currently the most promising one. Instead, it may be more 
efficient to have a majority of the doctors researching the most promising 
drug, with the rest researching alternatives that still have a decent chance of 
turning out to be the best.25 If we add that the doctors, as a rule, tend to pro-
                                                
24 Thanks to the Editors of Mind for raising these questions.  
25 See Ch. 8 of Kitcher (1993) for a thorough defense of the epistemic advantages bestowed 
upon a scientific community by this kind of diversity. One intuitive takeaway of Kitcher’s dis-
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duce their best research when they are permitted to investigate whichever 
drug sincerely seems to them to be the best, then it will make sense for Holly 
to research Y (even though she will be administering X to her patients). 
With this example in mind, we can consider another structurally similar 
example, in the realm of public policy. Suppose that Gavin is an expert on 
some issue of public importance and is assessing the merits of a policy, which 
may soon be enacted. When he thinks about the issue directly, he finds him-
self inclined toward the view that the policy is likely to have a quite positive 
impact. But, like Holly, Gavin is in the minority. The vast majority of other 
experts hold that the policy will, if enacted, have a quite negative impact. In 
the past, when Gavin has been in the minority like this, he has tended to be 
wrong much more often than right. As a result, he adopts two distinct atti-
tudes toward the policy: He harbors a sincere, disagreement-insulated view 
that the policy would be beneficial, while his all-things-considered opinion is 
that the policy is more likely to be detrimental. When it comes time to take 
action, on which of these attitudes should Gavin rely? Naturally, the answer 
to this question will depend on the specific act he is contemplating.  
If Gavin is the governor and thereby has the ability to enact or veto this 
policy entirely on his own, it is clear that he should veto the policy. The case 
is relevantly similar to the one involving Holly’s treatment of her patients. 
Gavin, like Holly, should pursue the course of action that is likeliest to bring 
about a favorable outcome, given all the information available. It would seem 
irresponsible to enact unilaterally a policy that the vast majority of experts 
deem likely harmful. 
In contrast, suppose that Gavin and the other experts are all members of a 
committee tasked with assessing the likely effects of the policy in question. 
Here, it is important for Gavin to advocate for his insulated viewpoint, de-
scribing the direct considerations that incline him to think that the policy is 
likely to bring about a favorable outcome. If Gavin is wrong, then, with any 
luck, the rest of the committee will be able to identify direct considerations 
that outweigh or undermine the ones he raised. Of course, there is some 
chance that his advocacy will sway the group to favor the policy. As long as 
the other experts on the committee are generally reliable in making these 
sorts of direct assessments, this change of opinion ought to be more likely to 
occur when Gavin happens to be right. If Gavin were to stay quiet in such a 
case, then the committee would be less likely to correct itself. 
Voting contexts raise still different issues. First, consider a jury that votes. 
One reason for jurors to rely on their disagreement-insulated attitudes in de-
termining how to vote is that doing so will tend to make the group more ac-
                                                                                                                          
cussion is that communities that rapidly approach consensus can be at a disadvantage, since 
inevitably they will occasionally converge around a mistaken opinion – which turns out to be 
quite inefficient. It is better for a community to hedge its bets, delaying convergence until the 
situation is relatively clear. 
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curate. As we saw in the Logic Team example, a group can have a higher 
probability of reaching the right verdict when the group members reason and 
vote independently than if they all defer to the most reliable individual per-
son in the group.26 And insulation from disagreement can serve to enforce 
this kind of independence, thereby making the group more accurate.27  
Let us turn to citizen voting. Suppose that Gavin is now contemplating 
whether to vote for or against the policy mentioned above. This is a particu-
larly complex case.28 On the one hand, there is some intuitive pressure to say 
that if Gavin really does regard the policy as likely to be detrimental, all 
things considered, on the basis of expert testimony, then he should vote 
against the policy. On the other hand, the considerations about group accura-
cy discussed in the context of jury voting, which count in favor of insulation, 
also seem applicable in this case. So there is a tension here that cannot be re-
solved in the abstract, without reference to the particulars of a given case.29 
The context of teaching also raises difficult and important issues. In one’s 
efforts to portray a controversial philosophical issue honestly and fairly to 
one’s students, is it better to rely on one’s insulated attitude or on one’s all-
things-considered attitude? It is worth noting that one need not rely on only 
one of these attitudes in all aspects of one’s teaching. For example, a philoso-
pher should not present her controversial views in the same way that an in-
troductory science teacher would present an established scientific theory: She 
should make clear to the students that there are well-qualified philosophers 
on both sides. But a teacher’s own inclinations can play a role in her teaching: 
She may tell her students how things look to her, when she considers the 
matter directly. And she may encourage the students to work out their own 
views by directly considering the relevant arguments. Similarly, these atti-
tudes may figure in complex ways in other decisions a teacher might make 
(e.g. in deciding what to put on the syllabus, or in designing exams). 
There are certainly going to be many other contexts in which it may not 
                                                
26 Condorcet’s (1785) jury theorem shows this. The Logic Team is, in a way, an application 
of the theorem. 
27 Insulation can prevent herding – congregating around a particular opinion – which is a 
natural result of properly accounting for disagreement evidence. See Lackey (2013) for a dis-
cussion showing that independence in belief-forming contexts is a tricky issue to resolve. 
28 One layer of complication stems from the fact that the body of voters might not properly 
be regarded as a ‘truth-seeking body’ in the way that juries can be. Instead, we might think of 
voting as a fair way to reconcile our incompatible preferences. On this picture, Gavin is enti-
tled to vote for the policy he would prefer to see enacted, quite apart from its likely conse-
quences for society at large. To circumvent this worry, we can suppose that Gavin would pre-
fer to enact the policy if and only if it is likely to have a positive impact, on the whole. See, e.g., 
Estlund (2008) for discussion of these issues. 
29 For example, one issue that arises here is that of expertise. In citizen voting, a person 
may not think that her fellow voters are particularly reliable with respect to the issue being 
voted on. The strength-in-numbers consideration discussed previously is applicable only if the 
other voters are sufficiently reliable, with respect to the disputed issue.  
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always be clear which of one’s attitudes one should rely on. This should not 
trouble us. In a real-world medical context, the treatment of patients and the 
research into potential treatments may not be cleanly separable (as was sup-
posed in the Doctors example). Such a case would make it difficult to deter-
mine whether and to what extent any of the doctors should be acting on their 
insulated views. Real-world cases are messy, and we should not assume that 
there is bound to be a clean way to handle them. Nonetheless, we can often 
identify some of the considerations that are relevant to making these kinds of 
determinations. 
Broadly speaking, we have observed two distinct benefits that can be as-
sociated with relying on one’s disagreement-insulated attitude (rather than 
on one’s all-things-considered attitude): First, a distinctive kind of sincerity 
can be enabled. Second, the efficiency of a deliberative, truth-seeking body 
can be enhanced due to the way that insulation can foster a valuable sort of 
cognitive diversity. Which attitude a person may choose to rely on in a given 
context will depend on which of these benefits can be obtained and on the 
extent to which she values them in that context. A philosopher may place a 
high value on sincerity; a doctor seeing patients may not.  
Insulated inclination is not a general substitute for belief. It is a separate 
item in our epistemic toolkit, to be used when the task before us makes its 
use appropriate. I suspect that there is no simple rule precisely describing the 
conditions that warrant reliance on an insulated attitude. But it does seem 
that, in the context of doing philosophy, employing a certain kind of insulat-
ed reasoning does make good sense.30 
6.  Inclination, insulated from what? 
I will conclude by exploring whether disagreement evidence is the only kind 
of higher-order evidence from which our philosophical reasoning should be 
insulated – for there is a compelling case to be made that our philosophical 
reasoning should be insulated from at least some other kinds of higher-order 
evidence as well. 
While disagreement in philosophy can be used to argue persuasively for 
No Rational Belief, it is by no means the only route to this conclusion. Sup-
                                                
30 It might be thought that the foregoing picture runs into difficulties when accounting for 
philosophical assertions – particularly if it is assumed that warranted assertion requires 
knowledge or rational belief. There are two important observations to make about this worry. 
First, it should be noted that this is not a special problem for the insulated inclination picture 
described here; it arises as soon as No Rational Belief is assumed. Second, it is worth pointing 
out that there may be some divergence between philosophical norms of assertion and ordinary 
norms of assertion. See Goldberg (2013b) and DeRose (forthcoming) for discussions that ex-
plore this idea. If norms of assertion are contextually sensitive in this way, it should be possi-
ble to generate norms of philosophical assertion that are compatible with the picture outlined 
in this paper. One specific such suggestion is that, in the context of philosophy, an assertion is 
warranted just in case it is based on a rational inclination, insulated from the appropriate evi-
dence. 
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pose that Erika, a committed Conciliationist, is philosophizing in her office. 
She discovers a philosophical question that, as far as she knows, has never 
been investigated by philosophers before. Since there is no disagreement 
(that she is aware of), her disagreement-insulated inclination and her all-
things-considered opinion will match. After some reflection on this new 
question, she finds that p seems right to her. But then she pauses, thinking 
about how much confidence she should have in p, given that it seems right. 
And it is not at all clear that Erika can, all things considered, regard p as like-
lier than its competitors. Here is one route Erika might take to a more agnos-
tic position on p:31 
Expected Disagreement: Although there is no disagreement about whether p yet, 
Erika expects there soon to be some. She thinks that this question is exceedingly 
likely to provoke disagreement from philosophers whom Erika respects (though 
she may not be able to predict exactly who will be on which side). She decides 
that she needn’t wait for anyone to say the words ‘I disagree.’ In anticipation of 
the disagreement, she divides her confidence equally between p and p’s soon-to-
be competitors. 
The above reasoning can be transformed into a more general argument for 
agnosticism about difficult issues in philosophy. So there might well be disa-
greement-independent reason to refrain from having much confidence in 
some of one’s philosophical views. And if there is, then for certain philosoph-
ical questions (such as those which are likely to engender substantial disa-
greement), disagreement-insulated inclination cannot fully deliver on its 
promise: It cannot allow us to arrive at firm, rational opinions about how the-
se philosophical questions should be answered. 
One way to react is to recognize that ‘evidence from expected disagree-
ment,’ like evidence from actual disagreement, constitutes higher-order evi-
dence of a certain sort. (The knowledge that fellow philosophers are likely to 
disagree with one, about a particular question, is some evidence that one’s 
own thinking about this question is likely to be somehow mistaken.) Perhaps 
the next move is to demand more insulation – insulation from all higher-
order evidence. Let’s call an inclination based solely on first-order evidence 
‘fully insulated.’32 So on this new proposal, our philosophical views should 
be our fully insulated inclinations. This would allow Erika to have the view 
that p, since p seemed correct to her before considering certain higher-order 
                                                
31 There are other higher-order routes to agnosticism in philosophy that make no essential 
reference to actual disagreement. Ballantyne (2014) pursues one such route, which appeals to 
the merely could-have-been disagreement of “counterfactual philosophers” (people who likely 
would have disagreed with your philosophical views, had they chosen to pursue philosophy). 
Frances (2016) discusses a different route, which involves being aware of one’s past philosoph-
ical failings. Yet another route may flow from thoughts about the difficulty of philosophical 
questions. 
32 Recall that this was the kind of insulated reasoning that Chalmers (2012) and others 
seemed to have in mind. 
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worries. Unfortunately, this revised proposal is too simple. The problem is 
that, sometimes, higher-order evidence does not seem to be evidence that 
philosophers should set aside in their thinking about the issues.  
Consider an analogy. Imagine that a member of an admissions committee 
learns that she is prone to implicit bias: Her (perhaps fully insulated) inclina-
tion is, often, to regard male applicants as being more deserving of admission 
than relevantly similar female applicants. This information constitutes high-
er-order evidence, since it concerns the committee member’s ability to com-
petently evaluate first-order evidence. But it does not seem to be evidence 
that she should set aside, in arriving at an independent judgment about a 
given applicant’s merit. Intuitively, she should attempt to compensate for her 
bias to some extent. And this will preclude her being fully insulated.  
Let us move to an example from philosophy. One can imagine learning 
that, in weighing a theory’s elegance against a theory’s resistance to potential 
counterexamples, one tends to overvalue one of these virtues, relative to the 
other. This information constitutes higher-order evidence, since it is evidence 
about one’s capacity to evaluate competing philosophical theories. But once 
someone did discover this about herself, I think it quite natural to think that 
she would be justified in compensating accordingly in reasoning about these 
theories. If she knows that she ordinarily tends to overvalue elegance (say), 
then she might respond by settling on a less elegant theory slightly more of-
ten than she otherwise would have. This does not seem immediately prob-
lematic. If anything, it would be problematic to ignore this information. So it 
seems clearly acceptable, at least sometimes, not to bracket higher-order evi-
dence in our philosophical thinking.  
From what, then, should our philosophical reasoning be insulated? In try-
ing to answer this question, we should think again about why insulation can 
be useful in the first place. Insulation has in part been motivated by sincerity. 
But in the previous section, we discussed a second advantage: It fosters cog-
nitive diversity. Plausibly, philosophy progresses most efficiently when vari-
ous distinct positions are being investigated. We could, perhaps, imagine a 
variant of the Logic Team case, in which each team is trying to find a proof of 
a theorem as quickly as possible. Other things equal, the team might well be 
better off if its members are not all trying the same type of proof. One might 
think that something similar could be true for philosophy too: If there is 
something valuable out there to be discovered (an argument, a counterexam-
ple, etc.), a group might be more on the whole likely to find it if the group’s 
members pursue many different paths.  
Suppose that the above is right: Cognitive diversity is indeed desirable in 
philosophy. This insight can help us to determine which higher-order evi-
dence to set aside in our philosophical reasoning. Specifically, if some higher-
order evidence tends to undermine cognitive diversity (when properly ac-
counted for), then that counts in favor of setting it aside. And if the higher-
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order evidence guarantees cognitive uniformity, then that counts strongly in 
favor of setting it aside. Does higher-order evidence ever tend to breed cogni-
tive uniformity in this way? It can. Evidence from disagreement is the most 
straightforward case. When two groups of philosophers disagree, Concilia-
tionism will recommend that both sides suspend judgment – a uniform out-
come. Evidence from expected disagreement functions in a similar manner. 
Like evidence from actual disagreement, it tends to support suspension of 
judgment. If all philosophers were to account for the expectation of disa-
greement in their reasoning (even if their reasoning were insulated from ac-
tual disagreement), a uniform agnosticism would result – at least with re-
spect to certain difficult issues. So it makes sense to ensure that our 
philosophical reasoning is insulated from disagreement and expected disa-
greement (and other kinds of higher-order evidence that would guarantee 
uniformity, if properly accounted for). 
But what about evidence about one’s own bias toward elegant theories? It 
is worth noting that that evidence about one’s elegance bias is unlike evi-
dence from disagreement in an important respect: Correctly compensating 
for it in no way guarantees uniformity: A disagreement between two philos-
ophers could easily persist, even after one or both of them compensated for 
an elegance bias afflicting them. At the same time, compensating for a perni-
cious elegance bias can undermine diversity in at least some cases: If I am the 
only one afflicted by the bias, then (before compensating) I might be inclined 
toward certain (particularly elegant) positions that others find less plausible. 
After compensating, I might come to dismiss those positions, too, making the 
overall distribution of views more uniform. If diversity were all that counts, 
then it would seem clear that I should not compensate (i.e. my reasoning 
should be insulated from evidence of this bias). 
But diversity is not all that counts. Yes, my bias might lead me to pursue 
views that no one else would. But since the bias is a pernicious one, it is likely 
making me less individually accurate. And individual accuracy counts, too. 
So our concern for diversity should be tempered by our concern for accuracy. 
One might worry, though, that a concern for accuracy could be used to 
motivate taking account of disagreement evidence, as well. After all, taking 
proper account of disagreement evidence also makes one more accurate in 
the long run. Setting it aside makes one less accurate. (This was especially 
dramatic in the Logic Team example.) In the case of both bias evidence and 
disagreement evidence, insulating facilitates diversity at the cost of individu-
al expected accuracy. Why insulate in one case but not the other? 
To see the difference, we should notice that there are three values we are 
simultaneously trying to promote: (1) individual expected accuracy, (2) cog-
nitive diversity, and (3) sincerity. In trying to determine which of our inclina-
tions should underlie our philosophical views, we should consider the extent 
to which each of these values may be promoted or undermined by a given 
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policy, were everyone to adopt it.  
Start with evidence from disagreement. Ensuring that philosophers rea-
son in a way that is insulated from disagreement evidence will hurt every-
one’s individual expected accuracy (as insulation always does). But it will 
enable sincerity to a great extent (as we saw in Turning Tide), and it will fa-
cilitate cognitive diversity to a great extent (for if everyone were to take ac-
count of disagreement evidence, complete uniformity – suspension of judgment 
by all parties – would result). So while there is a cost associated with insulat-
ing from disagreement evidence, there are substantial benefits (such as the 
avoidance of complete uniformity). 
The case for insulating from bias evidence is weaker. With respect to val-
ues (1) and (3), accuracy and sincerity, the case for insulating from bias evi-
dence may be as strong as the case for insulating from disagreement evi-
dence: After all, insulating from bias evidence hurts personal expected 
accuracy (just as insulating from disagreement evidence does), and insulating 
from bias evidence may enhance sincerity (since bias evidence does consti-
tute a kind of higher-order evidence). But while insulating from bias evi-
dence may enhance cognitive diversity to some extent (depending on the de-
tails of the case), it will not enhance diversity to the extent that insulating from 
disagreement evidence does. Properly accounting for bias evidence would 
not guarantee uniformity in the way that accounting for disagreement evi-
dence would. Even if every philosopher learned tomorrow that she harbored 
a bias toward elegant theories and compensated accordingly, it is very doubt-
ful that consensus would result. So there are reasons to favor insulating from 
disagreement over insulating from biases.  
This is not to offer a clean-cut rule telling us precisely when to insulate 
and when not to. But it is not obvious that any such rule should be given. I 
am tempted to think that we philosophers might have some flexibility in cer-
tain cases, due to the fact that philosophers value sincerity to varying de-
grees. Suppose for the moment that both of the first two values (individual 
expected accuracy and cognitive diversity) tell in favor of accounting for 
one’s elegance bias (i.e. not reasoning insulated from it). Still, I think that it 
might well make sense for a philosopher to adopt the view corresponding to 
her inclination insulated from the bias. Perhaps this philosopher is better able 
to defend her views when she finds herself sincerely committed to them. Or 
perhaps she finds that she is most creative when she argues on behalf of 
views that ‘seem right’ to her in the relevant sense. Even if, other things 
equal, the community might prefer (on accuracy and diversity grounds) to 
have a philosopher defending view A rather than view B, it could turn out to 
be more valuable to the philosophical community to have a creative and per-
suasive advocate of B rather than a lackluster advocate of A. So while there 
do seem to be some general observations we can make (e.g. insulating from 
disagreement is typically a good idea), we may not be able to delineate the 
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bounds of insulation in philosophy with perfect precision. Indeed, there may 
well be cases in which the philosopher has a choice: It will be acceptable to 
insulate, and also acceptable not to. Since we are trying to promote several 
different values that can diverge, this permissiveness is not a problem – in 
fact, it is just what we should expect. 
7 Conclusion 
We began by assuming that philosophical belief in controversial claims was 
irrational, in order to see what sense we could make of philosophy if this 
were so. We saw that the ‘sincere’ philosopher – the philosopher who holds 
views that seem correct to her – faces a dilemma: Either she may believe her 
views irrationally or else abandon an important kind of sincerity underlying 
her philosophically controversial commitments. This paper has proposed 
that, if careful, the sincere philosopher can retain most of what she might 
want. In thinking about philosophical questions, the sincere philosopher 
should set some of her evidence aside – including the evidence provided by 
disagreement. She can sincerely and rationally advocate the views that she is 
inclined toward, with this evidence set aside. Though she may not believe her 
controversial views, all things considered, she can hold views that seem cor-
rect to her, in an important sense. 
This is the view I am putting forward for your consideration. I fully ex-
pect to encounter dissenting opinion, and I confess that this expectation pre-
vents me from having high confidence in the proposal, all things considered. 
Nonetheless, I can say sincerely that it seems to me to be correct.33 
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